Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Euclid, Cardinal/Hayward/Jones and Harry G. Frankfurt

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41 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
8623 Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
13907 If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
6297 Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
9603 An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
9894 A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
8738 Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
22278 Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
8673 Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
10250 Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
10302 Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
14157 Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
1600 Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]